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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-STRIKING A NEEDED BALANCE BETWEEN

Braun
v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir.
1992).

THE RIGHTS OF PUBLISHERS AND THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC.

"Every free man has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he
pleases before the public . . . but if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own
temerity .... ." W. Blackstone. I
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Braun v. Soldier of
Fortune Magazine, Inc. ,2 recently held that a publisher may be held
liable in tort for the criminal conduct induced by an advertisement
included in its publication.' The standard for liability developed in
Braun is the latest in a series of attempts by the courts to reconcile
the conflict generated by the constitutional right to freedom of speech
and of the press, and by the need to protect society from the dangers
of "unprotected speech" such as criminal solicitation, incitement,
and libel.

4

Part II of this note briefly describes the facts which gave rise
to the cause of action in Braun. Part III sketches the history of
case law and legal thought concerning liability for speech which
induces illegal action. Part IV analyzes the reasoning the Braun
court employed in arriving at its holding. Finally, Part V discusses
the significance of the court's holding.
1. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE COMMON LAW, 151-52 (1st
Am. ed. 1772).
2. 968 F.2d 1110 (l1th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028-29 (1993).
3. Id. at 1119.
4. The courts have adopted different standards for determining the propriety
of burdening speech based upon the types of speech and governmental interests
involved. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 934 (4th
ed. 1991). In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), the Court adopted
Learned Hand's liability equation whereby the Court measures the burden imposed
upon the speech involved against the product of the probability and the magnitude
of resulting harm that might occur from the speech. In Konigsburg v. State Bar
of California, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961), the Supreme Court held that a case by case
balancing method should be employed to determine whether First Amendment
protection is appropriate. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974),
the Court adopted a definitional balancing method whereby the type of speech
determines the amount of protection it receives. See id. at 346-49.
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FACTS

On August 26, 1985, Richard Braun, accompanied by his son
Michael, drove down the driveway of their suburban Atlanta home.5
At the bottom of the driveway stood Sean Trevor Doutre who
proceeded to fire into Braun's car with a MAC 11 automatic pistol.6
The shots wounded Braun and his son.7 Braun managed to roll from
his car, landing face down on the driveway. 8 Michael also escaped
from the car, falling out onto the other side of the driveway. 9 Doutre
ran to Braun's side of the car and fired two shots into the back
of Braun's head.' 0 Doutre then walked to the other side of the car
where Michael lay wounded." Doutre raised his gun towards Michael,
then lowered it and placed his finger over his pursed lips before
2
running away.'
At the time of the shooting, Doutre was accompanied by two
other men, Richard Michael Savage and John Horton Moore. 3 The
facts later revealed that Doutre was a contract killer brought in for
the job by Savage, who had been hired by Moore and another
individual, Bruce Gastwirth, to kill Richard Braun. 4 Gastwirth had
been a business partner of Braun's; Moore was another of Gastwirth's
business associates. 5
Moore and Gastwirth obtained Savage's services in response to
an advertisement Savage had placed in Soldier of Fortune magazine
earlier that year. 16 The ad read as follows: "GUN FOR HIRE: 37
year old professional mercenary desires jobs. Vietnam Veteran. Discrete [sic] and very private. Body guard, courier, and other special
' 7
skills. All jobs considered.'
Sean Doutre had seen the advertisement while in Canada and
later traveled to Savage's home in Tennessee, where he went to work
5. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1112.
6. Id.
7. Id.

8.Id.
9. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 1083, 1084 (M.D.
Ala. 1990).
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. Id.
13. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1112.
14. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1325, 1327 (M.D.
Ala. 1991).
15. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1112.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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for Savage." Before killing Braun, Doutre had killed at least two
other persons for Savage.' 9
Michael Braun and his brother, Ian, sued Soldier of Fortune
for the wrongful death of their father, contending that the magazine
was negligent in publishing an ad which "created an unreasonable
risk of the solicitation and commission of violent criminal activity.'20
Michael filed an additional suit to recover for the personal injuries
21
he received in the incident.
Soldier of Fortune ran Savage's ad from June 1985 to March
1986.22 Joan Steel, the advertising manager of Soldier of Fortune
at the time, decided to run the ad after several conversations with
Savage. 21 Ms. Steel left the language of the ad submitted by Savage
intact except for the phrase "any and all jobs considered," which
was edited to read "all jobs considered." 24 At trial Savage testified
that he placed the ad with the intention of obtaining only legitimate
jobs. 25 In fact, he did obtain at least one legitimate job as a
bodyguard. 2 However, Savage conceded that, of the thirty to forty
calls he received a week in connection with the ad, the vast majority
solicited his participation in criminal activity. 2
At trial, both Ms. Steel and Robert Brown, the founder and
publisher of Soldier of Fortune magazine, denied having any knowledge of a connection between advertisements placed in the magazine
and solicitations for criminal activity. 2 They persisted in this contention despite the fact that numerous newspaper and magazine
articles were introduced linking criminal activity to advertisements
placed in Soldier of Fortune.29 Additionally, evidence was presented
showing that Soldier of Fortune was contacted on at least two
18. Braun, 757 F. Supp. at 1327.
19. Id.
20. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1112.
21. Id.
22. Id.

23. Braun, 757 F. Supp. at 1327.
24. Id.

25. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1112.
26. Id.
27. Id.

28. Braun, 757 F. Supp. at 1327.
29. Id. These articles included stories printed nationally in Time and Newsweek,
and newspaper articles that ran in Boulder, Colorado, where Soldier of Fortune
is published. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1113 n.1. The plaintiffs additionally showed that
the magazine subscribed to a clipping service "which sent articles to SOF [Soldier
of Fortune] from hundreds of newspapers and magazines." Braun, 757 F. Supp.
at 1327. The clipping service monitored magazines and newspapers. Whenever Soldier
of Fortune was mentioned, the service submitted a copy of the article to the client.
Braun, 968 F.2d at 1113 n.2.
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occasions by law enforcement officials concerning criminal activities
relating to the magazine's advertisements. 0
The trial court instructed the jury that Soldier of Fortune could
be held liable if the jury found
by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonable reading of
the advertisement in this case would have conveyed to a magazine
publisher, such as Soldier of Fortune, that this ad presented the
clear and present danger of causing serious harm to the public
from violent criminal activity. The Plaintiffs must prove that the
ad in question contained a clearly identifiable unreasonable risk,
that the offer in the ad is one to commit a serious violent crime,
3
including murder. '
The jury awarded Michael and Ian Braun two million dollars
for their wrongful death claim based on the expected earnings of
their father.3 2 Michael was awarded an additional $375,000 in compensatory damages and ten million dollars in punitive damages in
a separate claim for his personal injuries 3 The trial court denied
Soldier of Fortune's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, but ruled that it would grant Soldier of Fortune's motion
for a new trial unless Michael Braun agreed to reduce the punitive
34
damage award to two million dollars.
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the lower court's holding. 35 The appellate court found that Soldier
of Fortune had a legal duty which was violated by publishing
advertisements that subjected people to a clearly identifiable, unreasonable risk of harm. 36 Furthermore, the appellate court determined that the instructions issued to the jury by the district court
did not place an intolerable burden on the press in light of the First

Amendment .

7

III.

HISTORY

The court in Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc. 38 was
faced with a complex issue which required the consideration and
30. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1113.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1114.

33. Id.
34. Id. Michael agreed to the remittitur, and the judgment was subsequently
amended to reflect the reduction. Id.
35. Id. at 1122.

36. Id. at 1114.
37. Id. at 1115, 1117.
38. 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1993]

resolution of a number of First Amendment questions, each of which
has developed its own body of law. Resolution of the First Amendment questions presented required a determination of what speech
the First Amendment protects, the proper level of protection for
commercial speech, the level of First Amendment protection to be
granted publishers, and what constitutes speech inducing illegal action. In order to understand why the Braun court arrived at its
holding, it is important to start at the beginning and trace the
development of the doctrines around which the above questions
revolve.
A.

First Amendment Protection of Speech and Press

In the Braun case two social concerns, freedom of speech and
public safety, came into conflict. As a result the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals was forced to determine at what point the
constitutional protection for speech becomes subordinate to other
public policy demands. In this regard the Braun case is only a
microcosm of the 200 year long struggle to define the limits and
boundaries of free speech.
Freedom of speech is one of the fundamental principles upon
which our nation was founded.3 9 The founders of our country assumed
that freedom of speech would be protected by the omission of any
constitutional provision granting the government authority to regulate
it. 40 However, unsatisfied with this safeguard the First Amendment
4
was added to forbid, without qualification, the restraint of speech. '
In 1937 Justice Cardozo described the freedom of speech as "the
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of

freedom.

"42

The First Amendment explicitly grants unqualified freedom to
the press as well as to speech.4 3 In fact, freedom of the press has
been viewed as a separate institution and is considered to be an
39. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (citing Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)). Justice Brandeis's concurrence stated that
"Those who won our independence believed .

.

. that public discussion is a political

duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government."
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
40. 4 RONALD D.

ROTUNDA

& JOHN E.

NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL

SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.5 (2d ed. 1992).
41. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press .. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
LAW;

43. See supra note 41.
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important check upon the caprices of a powerful central government."

In New York Times Co. v. United States,45 Justice Black, in his
concurrence, wrote that "[tihe Government's power to censor the
press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to
censure the Government."46
Although the First Amendment freedoms have long been
considered inherent rights, they have never been considered absolute
privileges. 47 Oliver Wendell Holmes stated over seventy years ago
that even "[tihe most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a

panic.", 4 One federal court has more recently stated a similar position
in holding that "[enforcing] freedom of speech in disregard of the
rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself." ' 49 It is often
stated that the First Amendment does not prohibit the regulation
of speech, only the regulation of "the freedom" of speech. 0
44. Lisa F. Firenze, Publishers' Liabilityfor Commercial Advertisements: Testing
the Limits of the First Amendment, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 137, 140-41
(1990) (citing Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975)).
45. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
46. Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
47. An absolutist position was advocated by Justice Black in several cases.
However, his position was never adopted by the majority of the Court. MELVILLE
B.

NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH:

A

TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT,

§ 2.01 at 2-3 (1992). See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293
(1964) (Black, J., concurring); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black's rigid position may be explained in part by
his narrow interpretation of what constitutes "speech." See, e.g. Tinker v. Des
Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
48. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See also Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), where the Supreme Court stated that "the freedom of
speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an
absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may
choose .

. . ."

Id. at 666.

49. Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 651 F.Supp. 1397, 1400
(W.D. Ark. 1987) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949)). See also
16A AM. JuR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 506 (1979). "Although freedom of speech

or of the press under constitutional guaranties may not altogether be restrained,
he who abuses the right may nevertheless be held to liability therefor. The First
Amendment does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose." Id. § 506, at 343 (citations omitted).
50. WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 29
(1984). The author states that while all speech is encompassed within the First
Amendment, the phrase in the amendment, "the freedom of speech," is a reference
to a scope or latitude of freedom which has an external boundary. This interpretation
of the amendment allows the regulation -or proscription of that speech which is
determined not to fall within the protection of the freedom of speech. Id. See also
NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, § 16.6 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKELJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNMENT

pretation.

19 (1948)),

for a similar inter-
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Speech Capable of Inducing Illegal Action

The current legal doctrines which determine what speech the
First Amendment protects evolved to a large extent from a string
of cases dealing with speech that contained dangerous ideas or
induced unlawful action. The case which set the initial standard for
dealing with "dangerous" speech was Schenck v. United States.5'
The question in Schenck was whether a circular protesting the Selective
Service Act should receive First Amendment protection.5 2 In affirming
Schenck's conviction, Justice Holmes wrote the opinion of the Court,
stating that "[tihe question [of the constitutional protection for
speech] in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." 5 3
Justice Holmes' standard in Schenck served as the basis for the
opinion in Dennis v. United States,5 4 where the Court adopted
Learned Hand's formal interpretation of the clear and present danger
standard." Dennis involved an individual who was convicted of
attempting to organize a group of persons whose purpose was the
overthrow of the United States government.5 6 In affirming the
conviction, the Court stated that the test of First Amendment
protection must be "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger." 5 7
The doctrine established in Dennis was further developed by
the Supreme Court in Yates v. United States.5 8 There the Court
distinguished Dennis, in which the defendant advocated a course of
illegal action, from Yates, where the defendant was advocating a
particular doctrine.5 9 The Court held that advocacy of a particular
51. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
52. Id. at 51.

53. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
54. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
55. Id. at 510. The formal interpretation adopted was in essence Learned Hand's
liability equation developed in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169
(2d Cir. 1947). There Judge Hand wrote that liability is determined as a function
of whether the burden of precautions against the occurrence outweighs the loss
engendered times the probability of that loss's occurrence: B < L x P. Id. at 173.
56. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 497.
57. Id.at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir.
1950)).

58. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
59. Id. at 320-24. Joseph Hemmer in his treatise THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE FtsT AmENDMIENT points out the important distinction made by the Court.
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theory which may entail illegal conduct was protected under the
First Amendment, while the more direct advocacy of action was
not.6 This distinction expanded the protection of speech in First
6
Amendment cases to areas previously unprotected.
In 1969 the Court once again expanded the range of protected
speech when it considered the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio. 62 The
Court held that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
63
incite or produce such action.
The decision in Brandenburg is the origin of what has been
named the incitement doctrine, and it has guided the courts since
its adoption in 1969.6 The incitement doctrine requires that the
speaker not only cause imminent, unlawful activity but also that he
intend to cause it.65 The development of this doctrine was an attempt
He notes that in Dennis the Court based its conviction on an active attempt to
organize the overthrow of the government, whereas in Yates the defendant advocated
forcible overthrow only as an abstract doctrine. JOSEPH J. HEMMER, JR., THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16 (1991). As Justice Harlan stated
in his majority opinion, "those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged
to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in something."
Yates, 354 U.S. at 325.
60. Yates, 354 U.S. at 310.
61. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 221-22 (1961) (holding that the
requirements of Yates must be satisfied in order to uphold a conviction under the
Smith Act); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-99 (1961) (holding that to
obtain a conviction under the Smith Act there must be a present advocacy of
violent overthrow of the government and not merely the possibility of future
advocacy).
62. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburgthe defendant was charged with violating
a criminal syndicalism statute which prohibited advocating unlawful means of
terrorism in order to accomplish industrial or political reform. Id. at 444-45.
63. Id. at 447. This opinion gave rise to what came to be known as the
incitement doctrine.
64. ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 40, § 20.15, at 72. See also Hess v. Indiana,
414 U.S. 105 (1973), where in the middle of a heated protest rally the defendant
shouted out "We'll take the fucking street later." Id. at 110. The Court determined
that the qualification "later" prevented the speech from satisfying the "imminent
violence" requirement established in Brandenburg, and held that the "tendency to
lead to violence" is not enough to remove speech from the protection of the First
Amendment. Id. at 109. See also Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017,

1021 (5th Cir. 1987).
65. The incitement doctrine removes from constitutional protection speech directed toward and likely to produce violent or lawless conduct. Gerald R. Smith,
Note, Media Liability for Physical Injury Resulting from the Negligent Use of
Words, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1193, 1203 (1988).
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by the Supreme Court to provide more protection for free speech
than the earlier clear and present danger standard which was easily
manipulated."6
It has generally been held that the incitement doctrine denies
tort liability for speech because the speaker is seen only as advocating
and not inciting. 67 On this basis, courts have denied liability in cases
such as McCollum v. CBS.68 In McCollum, the court determined
that an Ozzy Osbourne song which glorified suicide did not rise to
the level of incitement under the Brandenburg formulation because
it did not advocate immediate action.6 9 As a result, the court held
that liability did not attach when a nineteen year old boy shot
himself while listening to an Osbourne song. 70
C.

The Commercial Speech Doctrine

Once it is determined that the speech in question falls under
the protection of the First Amendment, there may still be an issue
as to the level of constitutional protection a particular type of speech
will be accorded. The advertisement in Braun is an example of one
such type referred to as commercial speech. Commercial speech is
defined as speech which does no more than propose a commercial
transaction. 71 Because it is exclusively related to profit-motivated
exchanges, the Supreme Court has held that this type of speech
should not receive the same degree of constitutional protection as
noncommercial speech. 72 The line of Supreme Court cases which
limits the constitutional protection given commercial speech embodies
what has come to be known as the commercial speech doctrine.
The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
originated in 1942 in the case of Valentine v. Chrestensen."7 It
66. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 451-52.
67. David A. Anderson, Tortious Speech, 47 WAsH. & LEE L. Rv. 71, 74
(1990). See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987);
Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F.Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Olivia
N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981); Shannon v. Walt
Disney Prods., Inc., 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981).
68. 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1988).
69. Id. at 193.
70. Id. at 198.
71. Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973). However, "speech is not rendered commercial by the mere fact
that it relates to an advertisement." Id. at 384. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942), the Court stated that a determination of the commerciality of an
item is made by looking to its primary purpose. Id. at 55.
72. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976); Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-19 (1975).
73. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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involved the right of an individual to distribute leaflets on the street
in violation of a local ordinance established to minimize the
accumulation of trash in the streets. 74 The Supreme Court held that
commercial advertisements are not necessarily protected by the
Constitution. 75 In the later case of Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 76 the Court elaborated on the distinction, stating that
commercial speech is not necessarily the type of speech essential to
7
liberty, and thus, may be more closely regulated by the state. 7
The commercial speech doctrine of reduced constitutional
protection for commercial speech has been strictly construed by the
courts. 78 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 79 the Court held that
an advertisement which also furthered political debate on a socially
relevant topic was not commercial speech. 80 The Court reasoned that
the underlying purpose of the writing and not the forum is conclusive
in determining whether the writing should receive full constitutional
protection."'
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council,8 2 the Supreme Court appeared to eliminate the
commercial speech doctrine altogether when it held that a statutory
ban on the dissemination of information concerning the prices of
prescription drugs was a violation of the defendants' First Amendment
74. Id. at 53. The handbill consisted of a commercial advertisement on one
side, which solicited visitors to tour plaintiff's submarine which was moored at a
nearby state pier, and a protest on the other side, disparaging the action of the
city in refusing the plaintiff wharfage privileges at the city docks. Id.
75. Id. at 54.
76. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
77. Id. at 504-05.
78. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). In
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court limited the commercial speech doctrine
to purely commercial speech. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). In PittsburgPress,
the Court sidestepped the argument that commercial speech should receive constitutional protection, responding that whatever merits the argument may have in
other contexts, in cases involving illegal commercial activity, the argument is unpersuasive. Pittsburg Press, 413 U.S. at 388.
79. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
80. Id. at 266. The advertisement in Sullivan recited a list of racial abuses,
some of which were untrue, and at the end requested funds for the civil rights
movement. Id. at 256-57. The Court stated that the advertisement was not commercial
because it "expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and
sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives
are matters of the highest possible concern." Id. at 266. See also Pittsburg Press,
413 U.S. at 384 (holding that the mere fact that speech relates to an advertisement
does not render it commercial).
81. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266.
82. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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rights. 83 The Court stressed that the interest in and importance of
commercial speech may be just as great as with noncommercial
4
speech.
Less than a decade later, in an abrupt turnaround, the Court
revived the commercial speech doctrine in the case of Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.8 In this decision,.
the Court established that before commercial speech could receive
constitutional protection, it must be shown to concern lawful activity
and not be misleading.86 If it is determined that the speech is
constitutionally protected, then the governmental interest in restricting
the speech must be substantial, the proposed regulation must advance
the government interest asserted, and the regulation must not be
more restrictive than necessary. 87
More recently, the Supreme Court confirmed its support of the
commercial speech doctrine in Posadas De Puerto Rico Associates
v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,88 holding that commercial speech
receives only limited First Amendment protection which makes it
amenable to regulation.8 9 The Posadascase originated with the decision
of the Puerto Rican government to legalize gambling in order to
boost the tourism trade within the country. 90 However, fearful of
adverse effects on the local population, a statute was passed which
banned advertisements featuring gambling casinos that were directed
at the citizens of Puerto Rico. 91 In upholding the statute, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the ban advanced a substantial governmental
interest by inhibiting the occurrence of gambling among the local
population. 92
Cases from Central Hudson to Posadas established the
reemergence of the commercial speech doctrine under the present
Supreme Court. The continuing presence of this doctrine is pertinent
in that the consequent reduction in First Amendment protection may
result in the increased likelihood of obtaining successful prosecutions
83. Id. at 762.
84. Id.

85. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
86. Id.at 564.
87. Id. at 564-66. In a later case, Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469
(1989), the Court emphasized that there must be "a 'fit' between the legislature's
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends." Id. at 480.
88. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
89. Id. at 340. The Court applied the Central Hudson factors to evaluate the
constitutionality of the imposition of any regulation. Id.
90. Id. at 331-32.
91. Id.
92. Id.at 341.
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of claims of liability for negligent speech. 93 Specifically, in regard
to the Braun case, an expansive commercial speech doctrine could
result in increased occurrences of liability for published commercial
speech such as classified advertisements.
D.

Publisher Liability

The commercial speech doctrine encompasses cases, such as
Braun, which deal with the liability of publishers for the content
of their publications. While the First Amendment protection for
commercial speech has faded, the courts continue to resist placing
tort liability on publishers in most cases.9 The courts have expressed
concern over the enormous expenditures of money and time that
would be imposed upon publishers if they were required to investigate
the safety of each product or accuracy of each individual advertisement
that is submitted. 95 Courts are fearful that liability of this nature
would act as a chilling factor on certain types of speech.9
The earliest case in which tort liability was imposed against a
publisher is Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.9 7 In Hanberry, the defendant,
Good Housekeeping Magazine, had endorsed a product by placing
its seal of approval on the advertisement. 98 When the product failed
the plaintiff filed suit.9 The court held that the defendant had a
duty to use ordinary care in issuing an endorsement or certification
of the product's quality.' °° The court determined that the product
in Hanberry was negligently approved, and as a result found that
the defendant could be held liable for negligent misrepresentation. 10'

93. Donald B. Allegro & John D. LaDue, Comment, Eimann v. Soldier of
Fortune and "Negligent Advertising" Actions: Commercial Speech in an Era of
Reduced Firs, Amendment Protection, 64 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 157 (1989).
94. E.g., Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 662 F.Supp. 921 (E.D. La. 1987).
In this case, the court refused to impose upon a publisher the duty of investigating
into the background of advertisers who placed ads in the magazine. Id. at 923.
95. See, e.g., Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117; Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine,
Inc., 880 F.2d 830, 836 (5th Cir. 1989); Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 241 Cal.
Rptr. 101, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824, 825 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
96. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117 (citing Michael I. Meyerson, This Gun for Hire:
Dancing in the Dark of the First Amendment, 47 WAsH. & LEE L. Rv.267, 270
(1990)).
97. 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
98. Id. at 521.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 523.
101. Id.
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Hanberry is generally limited to situations where a publisher
affirmatively endorses a product or idea. 0 2 Absent an endorsement,
a publisher traditionally has no legal duty upon which a plaintiff
could base liability. 03 The most frequently cited case establishing
this general rule is Yuhas v. Mudge.'04 In Yuhas the court refused
to impose liability upon Popular Mechanics magazine for failing to
test an advertised product which later proved defective. 0 5
In addition to a claimed lack of duty, defendants such as those
in Braun fall back on the protection of the First Amendment. The
use of the First Amendment as a defense in publisher liability cases
originated in Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. 106 This case involved a
radio station which sponsored a competition that awarded a prize
to the first person to arrive at a mobile broadcasting unit.1' 7 In the
course of the contest a motorist was killed by two teenagers who
were racing to get to the mobile unit.1 8 The radio station claimed
that its broadcasts were protected under the First Amendment.'0 9
However, the California Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
claim was without merit, stating that "[tJhe First Amendment does
not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely because achieved
by word, rather than act.""10
In Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc."' the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals was faced with a situation similar to Weirum but arrived
at a different result. In Herceg an adolescent boy was killed attempting
to replicate the actions described in an article Hustler magazine
102. The court in Walters v. Seventeen Magazine distinguished the Hanberry
decision stating that, absent an endorsement or a cause of action based on other
traditional remedies, the court was "loathe to create a new tort of negligently
failing to investigate the safety of an advertised product." Walters, 241 Cal. Rptr.
at 102-03.
103. Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974)
(holding that no legal duty arises unless the publisher guarantees, warrants, or
endorses the defective product). See also Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F.
Supp. 921, 923 (E.D. La. 1987).
104. 322 A.2d 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
105. Id. at 825. The court held that an imposition of liability in this case would
open the door to liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time
and to an indeterminate class. Id. In Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977), plaintiff sued the retail dealer of a cookbook for failure to warn
that one of the ingredients listed in the book was poisonous when uncooked. The
court held that the retailer only warrants the tangible physical properties of the
book and not the ideas contained within. Id. at 1056.
106. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
107. Id. at 38.
108. Id. at 39.
109. Id. at 40.
110. Id.
111. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
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published detailing the practice of autoerotic asphyxiation.1 2 The
case was tried on the theory that the article constituted incitement
under the Brandenburg test." l3 The trial court found in favor of the
plaintiff, but the Fifth Circuit reversed noting that discussion of a
dangerous idea is not grounds to remove the speech from the protection
4
of the First Amendment."1
The conflict between cases such as Herceg and Weirum illustrate
the gray area into which the Braun case falls. The courts' decisions
in cases dealing with dangerous speech appear often to be more
attributable to the circumstances of the particular case than to legal
precedents. If Herceg is distinguishable from the decisions in Braun
and Weirum, it is only because, perhaps, the resulting conduct was
more reasonably foreseeable in the latter cases.
E.

Illegal Speech

Courts are less concerned with possible burdens placed on
publishers when the advertisement published is connected with illegal
activity."' The seminal case in this area, Pittsburg Press Co. v.
Pittsburg Commission on Human Relations," 6 foreshadowed the
decision in Braun. The case originated with the publication of sexdesignated advertising columns that violated a human relations
ordinance." 7 The Supreme Court stated in its opinion that liability
would no doubt be imposed if the publisher had published an
advertisement for narcotics or prostitutes." 8 The Court then took
this reasoning one step further and determined that, while the language
and placement of the advertisement did not explicitly state its criminal
intent, liability could still be imposed upon the editor." 9 It is this
holding, that liability may be imposed upon an editor in the absence
of an explicit criminal intent, which allows Pittsburg Press to serve
as an important precedent for the Braun case.
112. Id. at 1019.
113. Jonathan M. Hoffman, Soldiers of Misfortune, TiE BRIEF, Summer 1991
at 22.
114. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1019, 1024.
115. Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973). The Court in this case stated that "[a]ny First Amendment interest
which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal ... is
altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal . . . ." Id. at 389.

116. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
117. Id. at 378. The want ads in question were published under headings which
designated job preference by sex. This violated a local ordinance prohibiting discriminatory employment practices. Id. at 378-80.
118. Id.at 388.
119. Id. at 388-89. The court states that "[tlhe illegality in this case may be
less overt, but we see no difference in principle here." Id. at 388.
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Later cases have affirmed the Court's low opinion of granting
constitutional protection to speech which may be clearly shown to
a fine line
involve illegality. 120 However, the courts have drawn
2
between what does and does not concern illegality.' '
22
In News & Sun Sentinel Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs
a federal district court distinguished Pittsburg Press. 23 The court
held that an ordinance rendering it illegal to publish an ad for

construction services that did not contain the contractor's certification
number was unconstitutional.12 The ordinance was passed to prevent
uncertified contractors from advertising and, as a result, obtaining
work they were not authorized to perform .125 The court stated that
the ads in Pittsburg Press aided the commission of a crime, whereas,
in the Sentinel case the ads did not aid "in the incompetent or

fraudulent provision of contracting services.'

'1 26

The court's decision

was heavily influenced by the fact that imposing liability in Sentinel
would have placed a much more onerous burden on the publishers

than did the holding in Pittsburg Press. 27 This concern restates the
general underlying tension between First Amendment and negligence
liability issues.
The reasoning employed in Pittsburg Press set the stage for a
trio of cases which culminated in the Braun decision. The initial
case was Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc. ,128 which
involved a situation identical to Braun in that it dealt with a murder120. Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980). The Court stated that illegal speech may be regulated or banned entirely.
Id.at 563-64. See also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (holding that commercial speech promoting or encouraging
illegal activity may be banned); Cf. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th
Cir. 1972) (holding that a publisher may be held liable for an advertisement that
on its face expressed a discriminatory preference).
121. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (holding that a state
may not prohibit speech which might only result in criminal behavior); Dunagin
v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that an ad for alcohol
in a Mississippi newspaper was protected as legal commercial activity despite the
fact that alcohol is illegal in one-half of Mississippi's counties); Memphis Publishing
Co. v. Leech, 539 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) (holding that a statute requiring
a newspaper to place a warning against taking alcohol across state lines alongside
liquor ads was unconstitutional).
122. 693 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
123. Id.at 1071.
124. Id.at 1073.
125. Id.at 1067.
126. Id.at 1071.
127. Id.at 1071-73.
128. 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987). This opinion concerned Soldier of
Fortune's motion for summary judgment. Following the court's denial of the motion,
the case was settled.
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for-hire in conjunction with a Soldier of Fortune advertisement. 29
In a ruling which laid the ground work for the Braun opinion, the
court for the Western District of Arkansas held that a publisher's
rights are not absolutely privileged under the First Amendment. 130
The court recognized that the advertisement involved was commercial
speech and, as a result, was not deserving of the same degree of
constitutional protection afforded other types of speech.' The opinion
went on to state that when commercial speech may foreseeably result
32
in harm a triable issue of fact exists.
The second case, which also involved a fact scenario similar to
Braun, was Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc. 31 The
Fifth Circuit overruled a district court's decision which imposed
liability upon Soldier of Fortune.' The appellate court never reached
the First Amendment issue because it held that the ad itself was
too ambiguous to warrant an imposition of liability.' 3 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the jury instructions submitted
by the trial court placed a burden on publishers "to recognize ads
that 'reasonably could be interpreted as an offer to engage in illegal
activity' .
"...-,36
This was determined to be an unjustifiably heavy
burden on publishers. 37 The court did not, however, eliminate the
possibility that liability could be imposed on a publisher in a similar
case. 38 The court only determined that under a Pittsburg Press
standard the advertisement must clearly be intended to solicit criminal
39
activity. 1
129. Id.at 1398.
130. Id. at 1398-1400. The court, quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
683 (1972), pointed out that "[tihe publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity
from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the
rights and liberties of others." 651 F. Supp. at 1400. Additionally, the court cited
Blackstone for the proposition that a publisher must take the consequences for
damages occasioned by the publication of what is mischievous, improper, or illegal.
Id.at 1402.
131. 651 F. Supp. at 1398-99. The court noted that commercial speech was
considered to be outside the protection of the First Amendment until as recently
as 1975. Id. (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 505

(1981)).
132. 651 F. Supp. at 1402-03.
133. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989). The plaintiffs' deceased was murdered by a
contract killer hired through an advertisement placed in Soldier of Fortune. Id. at
831.
134. Id.at 838.

135. Id.at 836.
136. Id.at 835.
137. Id.at 838.

138. Id. at 834. The court stated that "SOF [Soldier of Fortune] owed no duty

to refrain from publishing a facially innocuous classified advertisement when the
ad's context-at most-made its message ambiguous." (emphasis added) Id.
139. Id.
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The holdings in Eimann and Norwood laid the framework for

the court's analysis in Braun where liability was imposed upon a
publisher. Although the court in Eimann refused to impose liability,

it set the stage for a determination of negligence in a case such as
Braun, in which the criminal solicitation in question was facially
determinable by a reading of the advertisement.140 Furthermore, the
court's ruling in Norwood, that in a case such as Braun the First
Amendment does not completely bar an imposition of liability on
a publisher, elucidated the necessary constitutional justifications to
4
uphold an imposition of liability.' '
IV.

REASONING

In Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc. the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit balanced traditional concepts of

negligence against First Amendment principles in arriving at a decision. Initially, the court decided the question of whether Soldier
of Fortune had acted negligently in running Michael Savage's advertisement. Specifically, the court focused on the issues of duty

and breach of duty. 42 The appellate court gave scant attention to
causation, stating that causation followed as a matter of course if
the requirements of the modified negligence standard applied by the
43
court were met.

The court looked to duty as the threshold question.1'4 In Georgia
the courts recognize "a 'general duty one owes to all the world not
to subject them to an unreasonable risk of harm.' -',4 The trial
court in Braun found that a duty could be found to exist between
the publisher and the public when the likelihood and gravity of the
possible harm from an advertisement is great and is easily discernible
from its face, and when the social utility of the advertisement is
140. The Eimann opinion stated only that a standard requiring a publisher to
reject all ambiguous ads is overly burdensome when balancing the burdens and
the risks. Id. at 837. By implication, in a case such as Braun where the intent of
the advertisement is more clear, it would be possible that the risks might outweigh
the burdens. Id.
141. Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1399-1400.
142. See Braun, 968 F.2d at 1114.
143. Id. at 1122. The court stated that since it had already determined that the
language of the advertisement should have alerted a reasonable publisher to the
clearly identifiable risk of harm occurring from the publication of the ad, it followed
that the crime was foreseeable and therefore "the chain of causation was not
broken." Id.
144. Id. at 1114. Because the murder in Braun took place in Georgia, the court
looked to Georgia law under the applicable conflict of laws holdings. Id.
145. Id. (quoting Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Ga.
1982)).
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small. 46 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision and
refuted Soldier of Fortune's argument that a publisher owes no duty
to the public in regard to the personal advertisements it publishes.

47

The court next addressed the issue of whether Soldier of Fortune
had breached its duty of care by running Savage's ad.'" Under
Georgia law, an unreasonable risk results when it is " 'of such
magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the
defendant's alleged negligent conduct.' ",149 The district court in
Braun found that, because the likelihood of harm resulting from
the advertisement was great and the social utility of the ad was
small, the imposition of liability was justified in this case. 50
On appeal, Soldier of Fortune contended that the district court
erred in its application of the risk-utility balancing test.", Soldier
of Fortune's defense was based primarily upon Eimann v. Soldier
of Fortune Magazine, Inc.,'5 2 a case factually similar to Braun, in

which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a district court's
9.4 million dollar jury verdict for the plaintiffs.'53 The basis for the
court's reversal was a finding that the jury instructions submitted
by the district court imposed too stringent a standard upon publishers,
in effect, forcing them to reject all ambiguously worded advertisem en ts. '5'

The court in Braun distinguished the Eimann decision based
upon the differing jury instructions given in the two cases.'" In
Eimann, the trial court submitted jury instructions which allowed
a finding of liability if the ad in question "could reasonably be
interpreted as an offer to commit crimes."'

56

Additionally, the Ei-

mann instructions placed upon publishers the burden of finding what
"a reasonably prudent publisher would discover" through investi-

57
gation into the context of an advertisement.

146. Braun, 749 F. Supp. at 1085 (citing W.

KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31,
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-92 (1965)).

PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND

at 170-71 (5th ed. 1984) and

RESTATEMENT

147. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1114. The court stated "that [Soldier of Fortune] had
a legal duty to refrain from publishing advertisements that subjected the public
... to a clearly identifiable unreasonable risk of harm." Id.
148. Id. at 1115.
149. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Thompson, 143 S.E.2d 51, 53 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965)).

150. Braun, 749 F. Supp. at 1085.
151. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1115.
152. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989).
153. Id. at 838.

154. Id.
155. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1115-16.
156. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 833.
157. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1116.
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The jury instructions in Braun were more restrictive, perhaps
as a result of the Eimann decision. In Braun the applicable jury
instruction allowed a finding of liability "only if the ad on its face
contained a 'clearly identifiable unreasonable risk' of harm to the
public."'5 8 This instruction constituted what the appellate court termed
a "modified" negligence standard. 15 9 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that the jury instructions given by the district
court were satisfactory because they properly precluded the imposition
of liability for ads which were ambiguous or posed an insubstantial
risk of harm to the public.160
The court reasoned that the preclusion of liability for ambiguous
ads was important because it eliminated the two concerns present
in the Eimann case. First, it removed the possibility that the court's
decision would place upon publishers the burden of attempting to
construe an, ambiguous advertisement. 6' Secondly, the instruction
eliminated the potential of a resulting duty to investigate the advertisement.1 62 The court held that the restrictive jury instructions
ensured sufficient protection for Soldier of Fortune's rights and were
6
therefore distinguishable from the instructions given in Eimann. 1
Once the issue of negligence was resolved, the court turned to
the issue of whether the modified negligence standard infringed upon
Soldier of Fortune's rights granted under the First Amendment.'"
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that, although
the ad in question constituted commercial speech, it still enjoyed
protection under the First Amendment.65 As a separate issue, however, the court recognized that First Amendment protection does
not extend to speech related to illegal activity.'"
In light of these counterveiling considerations, the court was
cautious in determining the appropriate standard of conduct in order
158. Id. (quoting district court jury instructions).
159. Id.at 1118.
160. Id.at 1116.
161. Id.
162. Id.(citing Eimann, 880 F.2d at 833).
163. Id.
164. Id.at 1116-17. The court cited New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
283 (1964), in which the Supreme Court held that "the Constitution delimits a
State's power" to award civil remedies, and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 349 (1974), in which the Court stressed that state law must be reconciled with
the competing interests under the First Amendment. Id.
165. Id.at 1117 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Pittsburg Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)).
166. Id. (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564).
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to avoid imposing too heavy a burden on publishers. 67 The court
emphasized that imposing liability upon a publisher for harm occasioned by the advertisements in its publication would increase the
risk of chilling public speech.' 68 The reasoning was that publishers
only provide a forum for advertising and are less likely to be
economically dependent on the income derived from a particular
advertisement than an advertiser who has a direct financial interest
in publicizing its product. 69 As a result, an advertiser is more likely
to ensure that his message reaches the public to promote sales in
situations where a publisher may forego publishing the advertisement
70
for fear of potential liability.
In Braun, the court determined that the modified negligence
standard adopted by the trial court adequately reflected that an
7
unduly heavy burden upon publishers would chill commercial speech.' '
The court found that this standard of conduct, unlike a traditional
negligence standard, was manageable by publishers, and thus less
likely to chill controversial but otherwise legitimate speech. 72 In
support of its decision, the court cited Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc."'
for the proposition that the modified negligence standard enunciated
in Braun was the most appropriate selection to protect First Amendment concerns. 74 The court concluded by stating that the modified
negligence standard was an accurate reflection of a constitutionally
permitted infringement upon the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment. 171
Senior Circuit Judge Eschbach voiced a brief dissent to the
majority's conclusion. 176 He agreed with the majority's intricate bal167. Id.(quoting Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 493 (1962)).
168. Id. (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia

Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
169. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117-18 (quoting Lisa F. Firenze, Note, Publisher's
Liability for Commercial Advertisements: Testing the Limits of the FirstAmendment,
23 COLUM.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 418

J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 137, 167 (1990)).
at 1118.
at 1117.
at 1118-19.
U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, the Supreme Court concluded that a publisher

may be held liable for defamation of a private individual as long as the standard
imposed was not liability without fault. Id. at 346-47.
174. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1119. The Supreme Court has held that liability may
be imposed by a state when a publisher negligently prints a defamatory statement
which makes apparent the substantial danger to reputation. See Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 348; Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 387-88 (1973).
175. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1119.
176. Id. at 1122 (Eschbach, J., dissenting).
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ancing of First Amendment concerns and with the adoption of the
modified negligence standard. 177 However, Judge Eschbach differed
from the majority in that he did not believe the advertisement in
question was clearly identifiable on its face as a solicitation for
criminal activity. 17 In addition, he expressed concern that the jury
instructions might not have been clear enough to enable the jury
to ascertain the necessary level of clarity which was required under
79
the standard of conduct.
V.

SIGNIFICANCE

The significance of the Braun decision is still largely speculative.
However, in at least one instance, printers have turned away a
publication because of the fear of liability inspired by Braun. 80
Several press organizations have expressed concern over the spectre
of increased liability raised by this decision. 81' The National Association for Information Services even went so far as to file a brief
as amicus curiae for Soldier of Fortune urging a reversal of the
82
Braun decision.
The true significance of Braun may be in its ability to serve
as an illustration of the current overlapping and inconsistent doctrines
which have grown up around the First Amendment right to freedom
of speech. In Braun the court determined a question of publisher
liability by incorporating standards developed in publisher liability
cases, defamation cases, cases involving illegal speech, and cases
dealing with commercial speech. The Eleventh Circuit could have
also employed the reasoning behind the incitement standard as other
circuit courts have done. 8 3
The existence of these numerous and varied doctrines may result
in inconsistent decisions determined as much by the type of analysis
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.

180. Twenty-three printers turned away a controversial article by Richard Mohr
entitled Gay Ideas: Outings and Other Controversies even though it was published
by the respectable Beacon Press. "Some printers [werel afraid of the liability meted
out in a recent suit against Soldier of Fortune Magazine." PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 1992,
at 4.

181. Press groups such as Magazine Publishers of America and the National
Newspapers Association urged the Supreme Court to accept the petition for certiorari
and reverse the lower court's holding. These groups noted that classified advertisements comprised a 10.5 billion dollar industry in 1991. David G. Savage,
Magazine Held Responsible for Ad that Led to Slaying, Los ANGELES Tims, Jan.
12, 1993, at Al.
182. Braun, 113 S.Ct. at 1028.
183. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
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the court selects as by the facts of the case. For instance, in Braun
the court downplayed Soldier of Fortune's ability to regulate the
advertisement as pure commercial speech, 8 4 even though recent cases
such as Posadashave given courts broad discretion to regulate speech
in accord with a substantial governmental interest." 5 The court also
downplayed the fact that illegal speech is wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment; stating that an unduly heavy burden
on publishers could impermissably chill otherwise protected commercial speech.1 16 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reached
its decision to adopt the modified negligence standard only after
looking to precedent established in defamation cases. 8 7 This was in
spite of the fact that defamation was the one area of First Amendment law which had no tangential relation to the facts of the case.
A totally different decision might have been reached under an
incitement analysis. The Braun court gave no discussion to this
doctrine although similar cases such as Herceg relied almost solely
upon it.""8 Had the court considered the Brandenburg incitement
standard, the imposition of liability would have been unlikely as
this standard is only applicable if the defendant's actions were
directed toward inciting imminent violence. 8 9
The court in Braun did look to the publisher liability cases for
precedent, but found them distinguishable. 90 Prior to Braun, courts
considering publisher liability cases had been reluctant to impose
liability upon publishers under similar circumstances for fear that
such a holding would result in the creation of a duty to investigate
the content of the advertisements a magazine chose to publish.' 9'
Braun allowed the imposition of liability upon a publisher if the
advertisement, on its face, presented a serious, clearly identifiable
danger, thus curtailing the duty to investigate. 92 The impact of
Braun on cases decided inder the publisher liability standard will
184. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117. The court cited Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,

425 U.S. at 762, and Pittsburg Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385, which
at a time when the commercial speech doctrine was in disfavor. Id.
court does not cite more recent cases which have diminished the
protection of commercial speech. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
185. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341.

were decided
However, the
constitutional
Associates v.

186. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117.

187.
188.
189.
text.
190.
191.
192.

See id. at 1118-19.
For a discussion of Herceg, see supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Brandenburg, see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying
Braun, 968 F.2d at 1118.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
Braun, 968 U.S. at 1119.
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depend on how courts will interpret the "clearly identifiable" language.
The United States Supreme Court could clarify the confusion
among these overlapping and often inconsistent doctrines. However,
the Court has not yet accepted for review a case dealing with media
liability for physical injury. 193 In the event that a petition for certiorari
were accepted, the recent attitude of the Court in reviving the
commercial speech doctrine, the denial of certiorari in the Braun
case, and Chief Justice Rehnquist's record for allowing limitations

on First Amendment protections, 94 all indicate that perhaps the
Court would adopt a standard analogous to the one established in
the Braun case.
John Peel

193. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in three such cases. See Gerald
R. Smith, Note, Media Liability for Physical Injury Resulting from the Negligent
Use of Words, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1193, 1195 (1988) (citing Herceg v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988); Olivia

N. v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert. denied,
458 U.S. 1108 (1982); Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983)).
194. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote dissenting opinions, which advocated a strict
interpretation of First Amendment protections, in numerous cases that maintained
or expanded First Amendment rights. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
453 U.S. 490 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy

v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

